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SHOOTING BLANKS: THE
INEFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROTECTION
OF LAWFUL COMMERCE IN ARMS ACT
Alden Crow*
I. INTRODUCTION
HE devastating effects of gun violence in America are no secret.
We are constantly bombarded by news stories of murders and
shootouts. Gun related injuries kill approximately 30,000 people
annually and injure another 60,000 to 84,000.1 The financial burden of
this violence, approximately $20 billion per year, 2 falls largely upon two
groups: individuals who must care for their injured family members and
cities that spend millions every year in an attempt to combat this vio-
lence.3 Those who perpetrate these crimes, however, are often penni-
less.4 Thus, both individuals and municipalities have begun to turn to
another source to redress their financial woes-the Gun Industry.5
The increased volume and success of lawsuits against the Gun Industry
prompted firearms sellers and manufacturers to lobby Congress for a law
protecting them from this onslaught of litigation.6 To reward these ef-
forts, Congress drafted and enacted the Protection of Lawful Commerce
in Arms Act ("PLCAA"), 7 which seeks to achieve two major goals: (1) to
prevent activist judges' ability to hold the Gun Industry liable for third
party acts; and (2) to curb the financial impact of the litigation crisis faced
by the Gun Industry.8 PLCAA's enactment has spurred arguments from
those on both sides of the gun debate concerning the Act's necessity, im-
pact, constitutionality and merit.
* J.D. Candidate, Dedman School of Law at Southern Methodist University, 2007.
1. James L. Daniels, Violating the Inviolable: Firearm Industry Retroactive Exemp-
tions and the Need for a New Test for Overreaching Federal Prohibitions, 38 J. MARSHALL
L. REv. 955, 959 (2005) (citing Brian J. Siebel, The Case Against the Gun Industry, 115
PuB. HEALTH REP. 410, 413 (2000); Linda Gunderson, The Financial Costs of Gun Vio-
lence, 131 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 483, 483 (1999)).
2. Id. (citing Rachana Bhowmik, Aiming for Accountability: How City Lawsuits Can
Help Reform an Irresponsible Gun Industry, 11 J.L. & POL'Y 67, 72 (2002)).
3. Bhowmik, supra note 2, at 69-72.
4. See id.
5. See id. at 122-23.
6. See Daniels, supra note 1, at 963-64.
7. Pub. L. No. 109-92, 119 Stat. 2095 (2005) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 7901-7903
(West 2006)).
8. Id. § 2(b), 119 Stat. at 2096.
1813
SMU LAW REVIEW
In hope of providing some clarity to the debate surrounding this hotly
contested piece of legislation, Part II of this Comment will begin by sim-
ply summarizing the Act's provisions. Part III will suggest that proposed
safety provisions left out of PLCAA's enacted version provide grounds
for suspicion as to the Act's true purposes. Part IV will then assess the
statistics offered in support of PLCAA's practical and legal necessity,
finding that such figures are fueled less by fact and more by one's feelings
about guns in general. Part V of this Comment will argue that, despite
the expected sweeping impact of PLCAA, the Act will have little real
force, given judges' ability to broadly interpret its exceptions. Finally,
Part VI will address arguments in favor of PLCAA's constitutionality,
thereby coming to two conclusions: (1) the Act is likely constitutional, but
(2) inherent constitutional limits on Congress' power to combat judicial
activism render PLCAA ineffective.
Analyzing these arguments in conjunction, this Comment will conclude
that the flimsy factual findings used to justify PLCAA's necessity, the
Act's questionable constitutionality, and even its drafters' inexplicable re-
fusal to include life-saving amendments amongst its provisions, do not
alone render PLCAA a bad act. Rather, PLCAA is a bad act because it
is, and will continue to be, wholly ineffective in serving its two main pur-
poses of combating judicial activism and curbing the gun litigation crisis.
This ineffectiveness reveals that PLCAA is not a bona fide piece of legis-
lation, but a political stunt meant to please those on both sides of the gun
debate.
II. SUMMARY OF THE PROTECTION OF LAWFUL
COMMERCE IN ARMS ACT
On October 26, 2005 President Bush signed PLCAA into effect,
thereby prohibiting any person from maintaining a "qualified civil liabil-
ity action" against a seller or manufacturer of firearms for harm arising
out of the unlawful misuse of that firearm. 9 More specifically, PLCAA
provides that no court, state or federal, 10 may hear a civil or admin-
istrative proceeding11 brought by any individual, group, or government
entity12 against a manufacturer1 3 or seller 14 of firearms or ammuni-
9. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 7901-7903.
10. Id. § 7902(a).
11. Id. § 7903(5)(A).
12. Id. § 7903(3). PLCAA prohibits "qualified civil liability action[s]" brought by "any
person" and defines "person" as "any individual, corporation, company, association, firm,
partnership, society, joint stock company, or any other entity, including any governmental
entity." Id.
13. Id. § 7903(5)(A). PLCAA defines "manufacturer" to include "a person who is en-
gaged in the business of manufacturing [firearms or ammunition] in interstate of foreign
commerce and who is licensed to engage in business as such a manufacturer. Id.
§ 7903(2).
14. Id. § 7903(5)(A). PLCAA defines "seller" to include importers, dealers, and sell-




tion,15 or a trade association, 16 for damages or equitable relief' 7 arising
out of the use of such firearms or ammunition in violation of any statute,
ordinance, or regulation. 18 PLCAA also calls for the dismissal of any
such "qualified civil liability action[s]" pending at the time of the Act's
signing. 19
There are, however, six enumerated exceptions to PLCAA's ban on
"qualified civil liability action[s]. '' 20 To begin with, PLCAA's prohibition
does not cover an action by a plaintiff who was directly harmed by a
violent crime against a defendant who transferred a firearm to a third
party with knowledge that such firearm would be used in that violent
crime. 2' Similarly exempt from PLCAA is any action against a firearm's
seller for "negligent entrustment or negligence per se."' 22 A third excep-
tion to PLCAA allows a person to maintain an action for harm proxi-
mately caused by a manufacturer or seller's knowing violation of a state
or federal law "applicable to the sale or marketing" of firearms or ammu-
nition.23 Also excluded is any "action for breach of contract or warranty
in connection with the purchase of" a firearm or ammunition.2 4 Addi-
tionally outside of PLCAA's ambit is any "action for death, physical inju-
ries or property damage resulting directly from a defect in design or
manufacture of the product, when used as intended or in a reasonably
foreseeable" and non-criminal manner.25 PLCAA's final exception al-
lows the continued institution of actions by the Attorney General under
Chapter 53 of Title 26 (the section of the Internal Revenue Code pertain-
15. Id. § 7903(4), (5)(A). PLCAA pertains to the sale or manufacture of "qualified
product[s]," which include firearms (new or antique), ammunition, "or a component part
of a firearm or ammunition, that has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign
commerce." Id. § 7903(4).
16. Id. § 7903(5)(A). A "trade association" is defined as either a "corporation, unin-
corporated association, federation, business league, professional or business organization
not organized or operated for profit and no part of the net earnings of which inures to the
benefit of any private shareholder or individual," or an "organization described in section
501 (c)(6) of the [Internal Revenue Code]; and "[two] or more members of which are man-
ufacturers or sellers of a qualified product." Id. § 7903(8).
17. Id. § 7903(5)(A) (prohibiting any "qualified civil liability action" for "damages,
punitive damages, injunctive or declaratory relief, abatement, restitution, fines, or penal-
ties, or other relief").
18. Id. § 7903(9).
19. Id. § 7902(b).
20. Id. § 7903(5)(A)(i)-(vi).
21. Id. § 7903(5)(A)(i). Section 924(b) of Title 18 provides that "[w]hoever knowingly
transfers a firearm, knowing that such firearm will be used to commit a crime of violence
... or drug trafficking crime . . .shall be imprisoned not more than 10 years, fined in
accordance with this title, or both." 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(h) (West 2006).
22. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7903(5)(A)(ii). PLCAA defines "negligent entrustment" as "the
supplying of a qualified product by a seller for use by another person when the seller
knows, or reasonably should know, the person to whom the product is supplied is likely to,
and does, use the product in a manner involving unreasonable risk of physical injury to the
person or others." Id. § 7903(5)(B).
23. Id. § 7903(5)(A)(iii)
24. Id. § 7903(5)(A)(iv).
25. Id. § 7903(5)(A)(v) (stating that "where the discharge of the product was caused
by a volitional act that constituted a criminal offense, then such act shall be considered the
sole proximate cause of any resulting death, personal injuries or property damage").
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ing to "Machine Guns, Destructive Devices, and other Certain Fire-
arms")2 6 or Chapter 44 of Title 18 (pertaining to the regulation of
firearms use) 27 of the United States Code.28
Also included in PLCAA are two gun safety provisions, 29 added to the
Act as congressional amendments, to be effective 180 days after the Act's
passage. 30 The first of these provisions, known as the Child Safety Lock
Act of 200531 ("CSLA"), mandates that a licensed manufacturer, im-
porter, or dealer provide a "secure gun storage or safety device" 32 with
the transfer of any handgun, 33 unless the gun is being transferred to a
government entity or has been defined by the Attorney General as a "cu-
rio or relic."' 34 A violation of this requirement may result in a six-month
license suspension, a $2,500 fine, or an administrative action by the Attor-
ney General.35 The CLSA also provides that a person using such a "se-
cure gun storage or safety device" is immune from suit for damages
arising out of a third party's unlawful misuse of a handgun if that third
party lacked permission to use the gun and the gun had been rendered
inoperable by the use of the safety device.36 This immunity, however,
does not extend to actions "brought against the person having lawful pos-
session and control of the handgun for negligent entrustment or negli-
gence per se." '37
PLCAA's second safety provision is an amendment to section 922(a) of
Title 18 (pertaining to "unlawful acts" concerning the use of firearms) 38
prohibiting the manufacture, import, or sale of "armor piercing ammuni-
tion" for purposes other than exportation, testing (as authorized by the
Attorney General), or transfer to a government agency. 39 As a result,
any person using such ammunition in furtherance of drug trafficking or
other violent crime may now be subject to an additional penalty, ranging
from a minimum fifteen years imprisonment to death in cases where the
crime results in murder.40 This provision also mandates a study by the
Attorney General to "determine whether a uniform standard for the test-
26. See 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 5801-5872 (West 2002).
27. See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 921-931 (West 2006).
28. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7903(5)(A)(vi).
29. See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 921-924.
30. Id. § 922(d) note.
31. Id. § 921(a) note.
32. Id. § 921(a)(34) (defining a "secure gun safety or storage device" as a device that is
"designed to prevent the firearm from being operated without first deactivating the de-
vice" or from being operated "by anyone not having access to the device," or a "safe, gun
safe, gun case, lock box, or other device that is designed to be or can be used to store a
firearm and that is designed to be unlocked only by means of a key, a combination, or
other similar means.").
33. Id. § 922(z)(1).
34. Id. § 922(z)(2)(c).
35. Id. § 924(p).
36. Id. § 922(z)(3)(A).
37. Id. § 922(z)(3)(C)(ii).
38. Id. § 922(a).
39. Id. § 922(a)(7), (8).
40. Id. § 924(c)(5).
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ing of projectiles against Body Armor is feasible. '41
III. THE CUTTING ROOM FLOOR
During Senate floor debates concerning PLCAA, Senator Larry Craig,
one of the main sponsors of the Act, was compelled to emphasize what
the Act does not do, stating the following: "This is not a gun industry
immunity bill .... This bill does not create a legal shield for anybody who
manufactures or sells a firearm."' 42 While this may be true, Senator Craig
failed to mention many other things that PLCAA does not do-namely,
PLCAA does not include safety provisions submitted by gun-control ad-
vocates but rejected by the Act's sponsors43-that call PLCAA's motives
into question.
One such provision, Kennedy Amendment No. 2619, called for an all-
out ban on ammunition capable of piercing body armor meeting "the
minimum standard for protection of law enforcement officers. ' 44 Al-
though this amendment was offered in response to the murder of seven-
teen law enforcement officers by armor-piercing bullets, 45 it was rejected
because the amendment would effectively ban rifle ammunition that,
while commonly used for hunting, was capable of piercing certain types
of armor.46 Instead, the Senate adopted Amendment No. 2625, 47 requir-
ing the Department of Justice to develop a standard by which to evaluate
what ammunition is in fact "armor-piercing. '48
Another seemingly common-sense gun-control amendment left out of
the enacted version of PLCAA was McCain Amendment No. 2636, which
would have closed a loophole allowing unlicensed dealers to sell firearms
at gun shows without conducting the federally-mandated background
check required of licensed dealers. 49 In support of this amendment, Sen-
ators presented evidence from both the National Rifle Association
("NRA") and the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms ("ATF") sug-
gesting that the "gun show loophole" was a major source of weapons
41. Id. § 924(c).
42. City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 401 F. Supp. 2d 244, 266-67 (E.D.N.Y.
2005) (citing 151 CONG. REC. S9087, S9088 (daily ed. July 27, 2005) (statement of Sen.
Craig)).
43. Charlene Carter & Seth Stern, S397-Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms
Act, CONG. Q. BILL ANALYSIS, Oct. 28, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 17714782 [hereinaf-
ter PLCAA Bill Analysis] (stating that the original bill
was headed toward Senate passage until gun control advocates succeeded in
adding a trio of amendments that would have required the sale of child safety
locks or a storage box with every handgun, criminal background checks
before any firearms sale at most gun shows and a [ten]-year extension of the
ban on semi-automatic assault weapons.).
44. 150 CONG. REC. S1973, S1973 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 2004) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
45. Id. at S1974 (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
46. See id. at S1973 (statement of Sen. Craig.) (stating that the Amendment. No. 2361
is "nothing more than a smokescreen to ban about [thirty] percent of ammunition that is
currently in the market for the purpose of hunting").
47. Id. at S1974.
48. Id. at S1973 (statement of Sen. Craig).
49. 150 CONG. REC. S1947, S1948 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 2004) (statement of Sen. McCain).
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used in terrorism and drug trafficking operations. 50 Although this
amendment was adopted as part of an early version of PLCAA,51 it was
erased prior to enactment over concerns that lengthy background checks
would prevent legitimate "mom and pop" arms collectors from trading
their guns at shows.52
Similarly absent from PLCAA's enacted version is Feinstein Amend-
ment No. 2637, which would have allowed for a ten-year extension of the
assault weapon ban under the Public Safety Act, an act that banned the
manufacture and sale of semiautomatic weapons and clips of more than
ten bullets, but expired in 2004.53 Many senators offered evidence illumi-
nating the ban's overwhelming public support 54 and its effectiveness in
curbing crime,55 resulting in its initial adoption.56 However, the provision
was left out of PLCAA's final version based on an argument that the
ban's effectiveness in decreasing assault weapons crimes was merely the
result of a correlation with an overall decreasing in the crime rate.57
A final gun-control amendment initially adopted but left out of PL-
CAA was Levin Amendment No. 2631, which qualified the Act's "civil
liability action ban" by allowing gun companies to continue to be sued if
their reckless or grossly negligent conduct was "a proximate cause of
death or injury. ' 58 According to Senator Levin, nothing in the Amend-
ment obscured PLCAA's goal of preventing suits against gun manufac-
turers and dealers for the crimes of third parties; rather, the Amendment
was simply a statement to the Gun Industry that "if your actions are reck-
50. See id. (stating that "according to the NRA, 'hundreds of thousands' of unlicensed
firearms sales occur at gun shows each year" and that "ATF has identified gun shows as the
second leading source of firearms recovered from illegal gun trafficking investigations");
id. at S1950 (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (offering evidence that "[glun shows accounted
for nearly [thirty-one] percent of the 84,000 guns illegally diverted during one [thirty]-
month period").
51. Id. at S1971 (showing that McCain Amendment No. 2636 was adopted by a vote of
53-46).
52. See id. at S1960 (statement of Sen. Hatch) (stating that "[g]un collectors who occa-
sionally attend guns shows for a day or two on a weekend will be shut down because they
will not be able to ... run the required check on a prospective buyer and make such a
transaction in that day"). But see id. (statement of Sen. Reed) (presenting evidence that
"[n]inety-one percent of these checks are accomplished in less than [five] minutes; [ninety-
five] percent in less than [two] hours").
53. Id. at S1951 (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
54. Id. (stating that "[t]he legislation has the support of [seventy-seven] percent of the
American people, and [sixty-six] percent of gun owners").
55. Id. (stating that the ban "has reduced traces of assault weapons crimes by two-
thirds in the last [ten] years"); id, at S1952 (statement of Sen. Schumer) (offering evidence
that as a result of the ban "[t]he number of guns, assault weapons, [nineteen] banned
weapons, used in crimes has dramatically declined-by 300%"); id. at S1953 (statement of
Sen. Dodd) (stating that since the enactment of the ban the percent of assault weapons
used in crimes has declined from 3.6% to 1.2%).
56. Id. at S1971 (showing that Feinstein Amendment No. 2637 was adopted by a vote
of 52-47).
57. Id. at S1958 (statement of Sen. Hatch) (arguing that "[t]he number of murders
committed with different weapons has decreased in all areas, proportionally, over the last
[ten] years").
58. 150 CONG. REC. S1973, S1975 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 2005) (statement of Sen. Levin).
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less or grossly negligent, then you are not going to be immunized. '59 As
with the gun control amendments before it, Levin Amendment No. 2631
was left out of PLCAA over fears that it was no more than "a require-
ment for manufacturers to defend themselves in court even though there
is no legitimate cause of action against them. '60 According to PLCAA
supporters, a manufacturer or dealer's gross negligence should be irrele-
vant if a plaintiff's injury was solely caused by a criminal's unlawful use.61
As stated above, all of these amendments (except Kennedy Amend-
ment No. 2619) were initially adopted as part of an earlier version of
PLCAA. However, both the NRA and PLCAA's initial sponsors felt
that these additions altered the bill to such an extent that it should not be
passed.62 Also disliked by PLCAA's sponsors was the Child Safety Lock
Act 63 which did, in fact, become part of the enacted version of PLCAA.64
The disfavor of such provisions by PLCAA's supporters detracts from the
sincerity of PLCAA's stated purposes of "prohibit[ing] causes of action
against manufacturers ... for the harm solely caused by the criminal or
unlawful misuse," and "preserv[ing] a citizen's access to a supply of fire-
arms and ammunition for all lawful purposes. '65 It is hard to imagine
how a ban on assault weapons and armor piercing bullets, child safety
lock requirements, mandatory background checks for sellers at guns
shows, and manufacturer liability for reckless actions do anything more
than promote public safety. PLCAA supporters' extreme distaste for
these amendments provides grounds for suspicion and bolsters the argu-
ments of those like Senator Dianne Feinstein, who argued that "[tihe bill
is about just one thing, the power and clout of the National Rifle
Association. 66
IV. THE NECESSITY OF PLCAA
A. PRACTICAL NECESSITY
Amongst PLCAA's enumerated purposes is ensuring an adequate sup-
ply of legal firearms and ammunition by protecting the Gun Industry
from the high costs incurred in defending unfounded lawsuits. 67 In sup-
port of this proposition, PLCAA's backers offered evidence of the bur-
59. Id.
60. Id. at S1974 (statement of Sen. Kyl).
61. See id.
62. Id. at S1975-76 (statement of Sen. Craig) (stating that "we have added a great deal
to this bill that makes it much less than clean" and that "I now believe [the bill] is so
dramatically wounded that it should not pass."); PLCAA Bill Analysis, supra note 43 (re-
porting that once the amendments were adopted the NRA-"with Craig, an NRA board
member-directed its allies in the Senate to turn against the measure").
63. 150 CONG. REc. at S1975 (statement of Sen. Craig) (stating that "[wie have added
trigger locks .... I don't think we can go there, nor do I believe we should go there").
64. 18 U.S.C.A. § 921(a)(34) (West 2006).
65. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7901(b)(1)-(2).
66. PLCAA Bill Analysis, supra note 43 (quoting Sen. Feinstein).
67. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 7901(b)(2) (stating that a purpose of PLCAA is "[t]o preserve a
citizen's access to a supply of firearms and ammunition for all lawful purposes, including
hunting, self-defense, collecting, and competitive or recreational shooting"); id.
2006] 1819
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den imposed by such lawsuits upon the Gun Industry, law-abiding
citizens, and the military, along with the potential "crisis" that could re-
sult if such suits were successful.68 According to them, frivolous lawsuits,
even if unsuccessful, cost the Gun Industry hundreds of millions of dol-
lars per year, thereby causing slumping stock prices, increased liability
insurance costs, and lost jobs.69 Even worse, PLCAA advocates contend,
if such suits are successful they could bankrupt the entire Gun Industry, 70
resulting in a greatly diminished (or possibly extinguished) supply of
American firearms and ammunition for both private and military use. 71
The enumerated congressional findings underlying PLCAA's enactment
envision the "crate of horribles" that would follow from such a successful
suit as follows:
The possibility of imposing liability on an entire industry for harm
that is solely caused by others is an abuse of the legal system, erodes
public confidence in our Nation's laws, threatens the diminution of a
§ 7901(b)(4) (stating that the enactment of PLCAA is meant to "[p]revent the use of such
lawsuits to impose unreasonable burdens on interstate and foreign commerce").
68. See infra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
69. See City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 401 F. Supp. 2d 244, 267-68
(E.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing 151 CONG. REC. S8908, S8910 (daily ed. July 26, 2005) (statement
of Sen. Sessions) (arguing that "[h]uge costs arise from simply defending an unjust lawsuit"
by "deplet[ing] an industry's resources and depress[ing] stock prices")); id. at 268 (citing
151 CONG. REC. S9087, S9107 (daily ed. July 27, 2005) (statement of Sen. Baucus) (stating
that the "effort that goes into defending these nuisance suits is a significant drain on the
firearms industry, costing jobs and millions of dollars, increasing business operating costs,
including sky-rocketing insurance costs")); See also NRA-ILA, REVIEW OF THE PROTEC-
TION OF LAWFUL COMMERCE IN ARMS ACT (2005), http://www.nraila.org/Issues/Fact
Sheets/Read.aspx?ID=170 (last visited Jan. 3, 2006) [hereinafter REVIEW] (finding that
"[w]hile the suits are unwarranted, the firearms industry has had to spend over $200 mil-
lion in defense"); NRA, PRESIDENT BUSH SIGNS "PROTECTION OF LAWFUL COMMERCE IN
ARMS ACT" (2006), http://www.nra.org/Article.aspx?id=4228 (last visited Jan. 3, 2006)
[hereinafter PROTECTION] (quoting Wayne LaPierre, N.R.A.'s Executive Vice President in
stating that "[t]his is a significant step toward saving millions of manufacturing jobs").
70. See Beretta, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 281 (citing 151 CONG. REC. at S8912 (statement of
Sen. Sessions) (arguing that "even a single verdict ... could bankrupt or in effect regulate
an entire segment of our economy ... and put it out of business")); id. at 268 (citing 151
CONG. REC. at S9107 (statement of Sen. Baucus) (stating that "nuisance suits... [threaten]
to put dealers and manufacturers out of business")); Protection, supra note 69 (quoting
President Bush in stating that "frivolous lawsuits ... harm America's small business, and
benefit a handful of lawyers at the expense of victims and consumers"); Sherly Gay Stol-
berg, Congress Passes New Legal Shield for Gun Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2005, at Al
(quoting NRA Executive Vice President Wayne Lafierre in stating that if such lawsuits are
allowed to continue, "American [gun] companies will cease to make products," and that
"[hjistory will show that this law helped save the American firearms industry from
collapse").
71. See Beretta, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 281 (citing 151 CONG. REC. at S8912 (statement of
Sen. Sessions) (discussing the dangers of bankruptcy of the Gun Industry)); Press Release,
Nat'l Rifle Ass'n, Historic Victory for the N.R.A., U.S. House of Representatives Passes
the "Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act" (Oct. 20, 2005), http://www.nraila.org/
News/Read/Releases.aspx?ID=6682 [hereinafter NRA Press Release] (quoting the De-
partment of Defense in stating "that passage of [PLCAA would help safeguard our na-
tional security by limiting unnecessary lawsuits against an industry that plays a critical role
in meeting the procurement needs of our men and women in uniform"); id. (quoting NRA
Chief Lobbyist Chris W. Cox in arguing that "[o]ur men and women in uniform abroad and
at home now will not have to rely on France, China or Germany to supply their firearms").
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basic constitutional right and civil liberty, invites the disassembly and
destabilization of other industries and economic sectors lawfully
competing in the free enterprise system of the United States, and
constitutes an unreasonable burden on interstate and foreign com-
merce of the United States. 72
Relying on these arguments, numerous sportsmen and business groups, as
well as the Department of Defense, support PLCAA as an imperative
means of maintaining the integrity of the American gun business as we
know it.73
PLCAA opponents, on the other hand, argue that the so-called "tidal
wave of litigation" 74 used to justify PLCAA's passage is exaggerated in
terms of both scale and cost.75 To bolster this argument, they point to
Congressional debates examining the SEC filings of gun giants like Smith
& Wesson and Ruger.76 Rather than revealing the hundreds of millions
of dollars in litigation costs purported to exist by PLCAA supporters, 77
they expose multi-million dollar sales figures, but only de minimus legal
expenses. 78 Also de minimus, according to such opponents, are the num-
ber of suits faced by the gun industry, accounting for only fifty-seven out
of the ten million torts suits filed between 1993 and 2003. 7 9 In fact, even
when such suits are brought, many seek injunctive relief only and there-
fore could not possibly have the economically crippling effects which PL-
CAA backers fear.80 Given such evidence, PLCAA opponents argue
that the Act is not a necessary means of avoiding a devastating litigation
crisis, but merely a "political payoff for industry special interests. 81
72. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7901(a)(6) (West 2006).
73. See House Passes Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, 52 GUNS MAG., 69,
69 ((stating that "America's business community weighed in strongly in favor for the bill,
with letters of support coming from the National Association of Manufacturers, U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, National Federation of Independent Businesses"); NRA Press Re-
lease, supra note 71 (stating that "[t]he Department of Defense stated that it 'strongly
supports"' PLCAA).
74. Dan O'Connell, Tort Reformers Score Some Wins, THE KIPLINGER LETTER, Nov.
28, 2005, available at http:/IKiplingerForecasts.com/php/test/wlogin.php3?loc=/home/sto-
ries/tortreformerssocresomewins.html.
75. See Beretta, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 280 (stating that "no crippling recoveries have taken
place, and no hearings have provided empirical support .... ); id. at 282 (citing 151 CONG.
REC. at S8913-14 (statement of Sen. Reed) (arguing that "[t]he gun lobby says it needs
protection because it is faced with a litigation crisis. The facts tell precisely the opposite
story. There is no crisis.")).
76. Id.
77. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
78. See Beretta, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 282-83 (citing 151 CONG. REc. at S8913-14 (state-
ment of Sen. Reed) (examining Smith & Wesson's SEC statement and showing that the
company reported $117.9 million in sales in 2004, and "they incurred [only] $4,535 in out-
of-pocket costs to defend product liability and municipal litigation claims and suits.")); id.
(stating that "Ruger told the SEC in a March 11, 2005 filing: It is not probable and is
unlikely that litigation, including punitive damages claims, will have a material adverse
effect on the financial position of the Company [gun manufacturer Strum]").
79. Id. at 283 (citing 151 CONG. Rnc. at S8913-14 (statement of Sen. Reed)).
80. Id.
81. Frank M. McClellan & Mark Rahdert, Opinion: Tort Shield Laws, NAT'L L.J., Dec.
12, 2005, at 27 (arguing that "no rational justification supports shield laws protecting eco-
nomically thriving sellers of handguns").
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These advocates concede that the true problem in ascertaining the scope
of these legal expenses is that most gun companies are privately owned
and therefore need not provide transparency in their financial state-
ments.82 They contend, however, that if the experience of private compa-
nies is similar to that of Smith & Wesson and Ruger, then the multi-
million dollar litigation crisis urged by PLCAA supporters is highly
inflated.83
B. LEGAL NECESSITY
Another justification offered for PLCAA's passage is that lawsuits
seeking to impose liability on the Gun Industry for third party use are
"without foundation" but impose the risk that they might be sustained by
a "maverick judicial officer or petit jury," thereby "expand[ing] civil lia-
bility in a manner never contemplated by the framers of the Constitution,
by Congress, or by the legislatures of the several states. '84 Underlying
this theory is an assumption that courts and state legislatures had been
doing an insufficient job of protecting against the success of such suits
and that PLCAA's enactment provided a necessary remedy. 85 PLCAA's
opponents attack the proposition on multiple grounds.
To begin with, it may be argued that if such suits against the Gun In-
dustry are truly "unmerited," "frivolous" or "without foundation," there
are many preexisting outlets for expedient and economical dismissal. For
example, an action that is "unmerited" or "without foundation" may be
dismissed through a motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), 86 a procedure which
the Supreme Court has found to be "just, speedy, and inexpensive. '87
Likewise, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 allows for the dismissal of
frivolous lawsuits brought "for any improper purpose, such as to harass
or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litiga-
tion,"'88 and allows for the issuance of sanctions. 89 These rules, along with
similar procedures available at the state level, 90 seem to directly address
PLCAA supporters' fear of "the anti-gun lobby's shameless attempts to
82. Beretta, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 283 (citing 151 CONG. REC. at S8913-14 (statement of
Sen. Reed)).
83. Id. at 282-83.
84. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7901(a)(7) (West 2006).
85. See generally 151 CONG. REC. E2164, E2164 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2005) (statement of
Rep. Sullivan) (stating that PLCAA provides an "opportunity to address unfounded law-
suits and guard a legal and law-abiding industry"); PLCAA Bill Analysis, supra note 43
(quoting Sen. Frist in arguing that "[tihis legislation brings meaningful reform to an indus-
try that needs protection from frivolous lawsuits").
86. FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b)(6).
87. See Susan Taylor Wall, No Spittin', No Cussin' and No Summary Judgment: Re-
thinking Motion Practice, S.C. LAW., May 1997, at 29 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317 (1986)).
88. FED. R. Crv. P. 11(b)(1).
89. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c).
90. See generally 73 AM. JUR. 2D Summary Judgment § 4 (2005).
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bankrupt the American firearms industry through reckless lawsuits." 91
Likewise, PLCAA opponents argue, fears of renegade judicial activism
should already be sufficiently remedied by institutional guarantees in the
appeals process (unless, of course, that activism is occurring at the Su-
preme Court level, which has not been the case thus far).
Also, where existing procedural elements have proved insufficient in
barring costly lawsuits, the majority of state legislatures have already en-
acted legislation to ban them. 92 One such example is section 1714.4 of
the California Code, which reads as follows:
In a products liability action, no firearm or ammunition shall be
deemed defective in design on the basis that the benefits of the prod-
uct do not outweigh the risk of injury posed by its potential to cause
serious injury, damage, or death when discharged. 93
Similarly, "North Carolina law. . . already prohibits frivolous lawsuits
against the firearm industry, ' 94 and Texas law "forbids city and county
governments from taking any legal action to hold gun manufacturers ac-
countable, even when they act irresponsibly in the way they design, mar-
ket or distribute weapons. '95 While PLCAA opponents concede that
some states have yet to pass such legislation, they argue that "different
state approaches" allow society to "reach a better understanding of how
to balance consumer interests in access to firearms with the public inter-
est in deterring violent crime and compensating victims." '96
Furthermore, PLCAA opponents argue that contrary to the allegations
of "maverick" judicial activism, "courts have shown great respect for the
separation of powers by dismissing those lawsuits that call on them to
impose new restrictions on gun sales."'97 Of the numerous lawsuits at-
tempting to hold the Gun Industry liable for third party actions, only a
handful have been successful. 98 Those that have been allowed to proceed
are arguably the most egregious and could possibly remain viable under
91. REVIEW, supra note 69.
92. PROTECrION, supra note 69 (stating that "[i]n recent years, [thirty-three] states
passed similar legislation outlawing frivolous lawsuits intended to bankrupt the gun
industry").
93. CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1714.4 (repealed 2002); Frank J. Vandall, A Preliminary Con-
sideration of the Issues Raised in the Firearms Sellers Immunity Bill, 38 AKRON L. REV. 113,
114 (2005).
94. 151 CONG. REC. E2183, E2183 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 2005) (statement of Rep.
Etheridge).
95. BRADY CAMPAIGN, THE BRADY CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, STATE
LAW: TEXAS, http://www.bradycampaign.org/viewstate.php?st=TX (last visited Aug. 25,
2006).
96. McClellan & Rahdert, supra note 81, at 27. But see PROTECTION, supra note 69
(arguing that PLCAA is needed to create "judicial uniformity").
97. Timothy D. Lytton, Gun Bill a Messy Mix of Law, Politics, ALB. TIMES UNION,
Oct. 27, 2005, at A13, available at 2005 WLNR 17460961.
98. Id. (stating that "[t]he courts have, in fact, already rejected all but a few of the
suits, weeding out those that overreach from those that present legitimate claims under
established doctrine"); Daniels, supra note 1, at 962 (stating that "thirty-two more cities
and municipalities followed suit in a common attempt to recoup their financial losses and
force the [gun] industry to adopt safer standards," but were met with "little success").
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PLCAA's limited exceptions. One such case is Hicks v. T&M Jewelry, in
which the Kentucky Court of Appeals allowed a trial to proceed on the
issue of whether a federally-licensed gun dealer was negligent for selling a
.22 caliber semi-automatic pistol to an underage buyer, who later acciden-
tally shot a woman in the face.99 PLCAA opponents contend that this
case and those like it are far from frivolous and would likely still be al-
lowed under PLCAA's exception for negligent entrustment actions. 00
C. CONCLUSION AS TO PLCAA's NECESSITY
Based on the facts asserted above, PLCAA opponents argue that pre-
existing procedural and institutional guarantees of the judicial process,
coupled with current state legislative enactments and judicial restraint,
show that the Act's passage was neither necessary nor warranted. PL-
CAA supporters, on the other hand, contend that there is substantial sta-
tistical evidence to demonstrate PLCAA's necessity. The figures offered
by these opposing ideologues are so much in conflict that they provide
minimal guidance in evaluating the wisdom of PLCAA's enactment.
While the actual cost of gun lawsuits likely lies somewhere in between the
hundreds of millions asserted by PLCAA supporters and the de minimus
expenses urged by the Act's opponents, one's true opinion as to PL-
CAA's necessity seems almost wholly dependent upon one's feelings
about guns in general. Those who like guns see the act as an imperative
means of protecting a historically vital industry. On the other hand, those
who dislike guns see PLCAA as unwarranted favor to the producers of
inherently dangerous products. Congress, apparently, attempted to de-
cide this debate in favor of gun lovers when it enacted PLCAA.
V. THE IMPACT OF PLCAA
A. EXPECTED IMPACT
Prior to PLCAA's enactment, many advocates from competing sides of
the gun control debate feared (or eagerly anticipated) the new law's
sweeping economic and legal impact. From the PLCAA supporters'
point of view, the Act was expected to be the saving grace of an industry
wriggling under the financial burden of unwarranted lawsuits. The NRA
heralded PLCAA's passage as an "historic" and "monumental victory"
and speculated that "[h]istory will show that this law helped save the
American firearms industry"'' and "American icons like Remington,
Ruger, Winchester, and Smith & Wesson from politically motivated law-
suits.' 0 2 Likewise, the Act's opponents speculated that PLCAA would
"be a great boon to the gun industry, [but] it will do irreparable damage
99. See T&M Jewelry, Inc. v. Hicks, 189 S.W.3d 526 (Ky. 2006).
100. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
101. PROTECTION, supra note 69 (quoting NRA Executive Vice President Wayne
LaPierre).
102. NRA Press Release, supra note 71 (quoting NRA Chief Lobbyist Chris Cox).
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to the integrity of the civil justice system,"'103 and argued that the Act
would be "the best buddy the gun industry could ask for.' 10 4
Similarly feared and anticipated was PLCAA's impact on both pending
and future lawsuits. Prior to PLCAA's enactment, the vast majority of
gun suits arising out of third party misuse fell into two categories: individ-
ual and municipal.'0 5 Individual lawsuits, for the most part, are brought
by persons alleging that gun manufacturers negligently or recklessly sup-
plied guns either to dealers with a history of loose sales practices or to
buyers whom they should have known would use the guns illegally. 10 6 As
a result, when individuals are in fact injured by these buyers' unlawful
use, they argue that the manufacturers and dealers should be held par-
tially liable. 10 7 Municipal lawsuits, on the other hand, are brought by
government entities and typically allege that "the gun industry causes a
public nuisance by being negligent in gun sales practices, particularly by
making them available to minors and others who are banned from own-
ing guns."' 0 8 These suits usually seek injunctive relief to correct such
practices. 0 9
The Act's opponents feared that PLCAA would bar both types of law-
suits (municipal and individual), arguing that "[tlhe law sets an impossi-
bly high bar for pursuing actions against gun-makers, . . . prevent[ing]
more than just the municipal lawsuits, even prohibiting legitimate law-
suits alleging negligence by gun manufacturers."' 10 PLCAA supporters
echoed this sentiment, anticipating that PLCAA would "provide the full
protection sought by the firearms industry and nullify pending and pre-
vent future lawsuits.""' Some gun control advocates went even further,
predicting that the Act would "block administrative proceedings that can
lead to the revocation of a gun dealer's federal firearms license,"'1 2 and
possibly even "open[] the door for some special favors in other
industries."'" 3
103. Lytton, supra note 97, at A13.
104. James Alan Fox, Op-Ed; We're Under the Gun so Let's Register It, BOSTON HER-
ALD, Dec. 5, 2005, at 29, available at 2005 WLNR 19565713.




108. Rep. Schakowsky Speaks Out Against Bill that Hurts Victims, Protects Industry,
U.S. FED. NEWS, Oct. 28, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 17941902.
109. Id.
110. William Freebairn, Gunmaker Seeks Suit Dismissal, THE REPUBLICAN, Oct. 29,
2005, at C7, available at 2005 WLNR 17651123 (quoting Zach D. Ragbourn, Spokesman
for the Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence).
111. House Passes Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, supra note 73, at 69.
112. PLCAA Bill Analysis, supra note 43.
113. O'Connell, supra note 74 (quoting Professor Paul Rothstein, Georgetown Univ.).
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B. IMPACT ON MUNICIPAL LAWSUITS
1. Actual Impact-City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.
While it is certainly too early to assess the full impact of PLCAA
(which is less than four months old at the time of the writing of this Com-
ment), the one case addressing the Act thus far suggests that the fears of
its sweeping effect are premature.
In City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., the City of New York
brought a municipal action against a multitude of major firearms suppli-
ers "seeking injunctive relief and abatement of an alleged public nuisance
caused by the Gun Industry's negligent and reckless merchandising. 1 1 4
Specifically, the city alleged the following: (1) the defendant suppliers
marketed and distributed arms knowing that they would be "diverted
into an illegal gun market catering to juveniles, criminals and other per-
sons prohibited from owning guns"'115 through methods such as multiple
purchases," 6 straw sales' 17 and illegal sales at gun shows;1 8 (2) that de-
fendants could have easily amended their marketing and distribution
practices to prevent or reduce such diversion, but chose not to do so;119
and (3) as a result "[d]efendants' sales and distribution practices accord-
ingly cause, contribute to and maintain a public nuisance consisting of a
large and ready supply of guns purchased by criminals and used in the
commission of crimes.' 120 In response, the City sought an injunction "re-
quiring defendants to adopt reasonable measures that [would] reduce the
movement of their products into the illegal secondary market, thereby
abating the public nuisance.' u2
Prior to Beretta's scheduled trial date of November 28, 2005, President
Bush signed PLCAA into effect, prompting defendants to file for dismis-
sal, arguing that the case fell within the statute's immediate dismissal of
pending "qualified civil liability action[s]."'1 22 In response, the City ar-
gued that the action should be allowed to proceed either because PL-
CAA was unconstitutional, or in the alternative, because the instant case
fit into an exception to the definition of "qualified civil liability
action."1 23
114. City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 401 F. Supp. 2d 244, 266-67 (E.D.N.Y.
2005).
115. Id. at 252.
116. Id. at 255 (stating that a "multiple sale" occurs when a "purchaser buys more than
one gun . . .from a licensed dealer with the intention of later transferring the guns to
persons unqualified to purchase under federal and state gun laws").
117. Id. (defining a "straw purchase" as a scenario "wherein the purchaser buys the gun
from a licensed dealer for a person who is not qualified to purchase the firearm").
118. Id. at 254 (stating that sales at gun shows create "a loophole for guns to be sup-
plied to criminals, and defendants are aware of this loophole"). See also supra notes 49-52
and accompanying text.
119. Beretta, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 254.
120. Id. at 253.
121. Id. at 252.




In assessing these arguments, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eastern District of New York held that PLCAA was, in fact, constitu-
tional (which will be discussed later in this Comment). 124 However, the
court also found that the City's public nuisance claim fell within PL-
CAA's third exception 125 to the definition of "qualified civil liability ac-
tion," which exempts from coverage:
(iii) an action in which a manufacturer or seller of a qualified prod-
uct knowingly violated a State or Federal statute applicable to the
sale or marketing of the product, and the violation was a proximate
cause of the harm for which relief is sought .... 126
Relying on two examples of exempted claims provided in PLCAA's
text, defendants argued that this exception applied only to claims alleging
"violations of statutes specifically-and explicitly-regulating the manner
in which firearms are sold or marketed."'1 27 The city's claim, which was
brought under a general nuisance statute not specifically mentioning fire-
arms, was therefore outside of the exception's purview. 128 The court, an-
alyzing the text of the exception, found this argument unpersuasive. 129
According to the court, the exception spoke of statutes "applicable to the
sale and marketing of firearms" and therefore covered any claim brought
under a law "capable of being applied" to the marketing or sale of
arms. 130 Had Congress meant for the exception to apply exclusively to
statutes "directly" or "specifically" covering firearms sales, they could
have easily said so.' 3 1 Since they did not, however, the court refused to
dismiss the city's claim because the public nuisance statute under which it
was brought, while not explicitly mentioning the marketing or sale of fire-
arms, was certainly capable of being applied to such activities.132 A stay
was then granted to the defendants allowing them to appeal the
decision. 133
2. Projected Impact of and Reaction to Beretta
Given the initial hype concerning the expected impact of PLCAA, the
Beretta decision is both shocking and telling. As stated above, many ad-
vocates from both sides of the table speculated that PLCAA's ban on
"civil liability actions" would bring about the death of the municipal law-
124. Id. at 271-97. See also infra Pt. VI.
125. Beretta, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 261-71.
126. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7903(5)(A)(iii) (West 2006) (emphasis added).
127. Beretta, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 259 (relying on 15 U.S.C.A. § 7904(A)(5)(iii)(I)) (em-
phasis added).
128. Id. (The statute under which the claim was brought provides the following: "A
person is guilty of criminal nuisance in the second degree when: By conduct either unlaw-
ful in itself or unreasonable under all the circumstances, he knowingly or recklessly creates
or maintains a condition which endangers the safety or health of a considerable number of
persons .. "). Id. at 261 (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.45 (McKinney 2005)).
129. Id. at 261-64.
130. Id. at 261, 262 (emphasis added).
131. ld. at 264.
132. Id. at 262.
133. Id. at 298.
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sUit.134 Thus, the Eastern District of New York's refusal to dismiss a clas-
sic municipal lawsuit in Beretta came as a shock to those who predicted
PLCAA's sweeping regime. According to PLCAA supporters, Beretta
"was exactly the type of lawsuit the new law was devised to stop,"'1 35 and
was one of the "very municipal lawsuits that spurred [PLCAA's]
passage. "136
New York City's success in Beretta caused some, like attorney John
Renzulli, attorney for the gun manufacturer Glock, to dismiss the opin-
ion as a flat-out misapplication of PLCAA, exclaiming "I don't think [the
city's suit] even remotely fits into the exception .... "137 Others, how-
ever, saw Beretta as a sign of hope and a reason to temper their specula-
tion about PLCAA's wrath. For example, Eric Proshansky, Assistant
Corporate Counsel for New York City in the suit, found that the "ruling
was a 'straightforward' interpretation of a statute that was not intended
to give absolute immunity to the gun industry."'1 38
Correct or not, the Beretta ruling suggests that the future vitality of the
municipal lawsuit now centers upon a solution to the "fundamental disa-
greement as to the scope of [the] exception" addressed in the case. 139 It
is important to note that this solution lies not with the legislature that
enacted PLCAA, but with the courts whose power the Act sought to
anesthetize.
Take for example City of Gary v. Smith & Wesson,140 a case which,
prior to Beretta, many thought would be dismissed by PLCAA.141 In
Smith & Wesson, the City of Gary, Indiana brought a public nuisance
action against numerous gun sellers and manufacturers for "affirmatively
rely[ing] upon the reasonably foreseeable laxness of dealers, and employ-
ees, and the ingenuity of criminals to ensure that thousands of handguns
find their way into their expected place in the illegal secondary mar-
ket.' 42 The state nuisance statute under which the city's claim was as-
serted reads as follows:
Whatever is (1) injurious to health; (2) indecent; (3) offensive to the
senses; or (4) an obstruction to the free use of property; so as essen-
tially to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property,
is a nuisance, and the subject of an action. 143
134. See supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
135. William K. Rashbaum, Judge Clears Way for City to Sue Gun Companies, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 3, 2005, at B3 (quoting Lawrence G. Keane, attorney for the National Shoot-
ing Sports Foundation).
136. Freebairn, supra note 110, at C7.
137. Tom Perrotta, City Wins Bid to Sue Manufacturers over Marketing of Weapons,
N.Y.L.J., Dec. 5. 2005, at 1.
138. Id.
139. Id. (quoting Michael Rice, attorney for Colt).
140. 801 N.E.2d 1222 (Ind. 2003).
141. See generally House Passes Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, supra
note 73, at 69.
142. Smith & Wesson, 801 N.E.2d at 1231.
143. Id. at 1229.
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Despite the Court of Appeal's dismissal of this claim, 144 the Supreme
Court of Indiana found that the City had provided arguments "sufficient
to allege an unreasonable chain of distribution of handguns sufficient to
give rise to a public nuisance" claim and therefore reversed and re-
manded the case. 145 Before the case could be re-heard, the defendant
manufacturers filed a motion to dismiss "on the ground that the Protec-
tion of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act... requires the immediate dismis-
sal of [the] case."'1 46 The success of this motion, like those in many other
pending cases, rests on the Indiana courts' assessment of Beretta's core
argument.
If the court chooses to read PLCAA's exceptions narrowly, as advo-
cated by the defendants in Beretta, then it is clear that the nuisance stat-
ute at issue in Smith & Wesson does not "specifically or explicitly" apply
to firearms, and the action should be dismissed. 147 On the other hand, if
the Indiana court applies the reading endorsed by Beretta, then it is
equally obvious that the statute at issue, while never directly mentioning
firearms, is "capable of being applied" to firearms sales. 148 Whatever
route is chosen, it is a judicial choice of interpretation that will dictate the
outcome in this and almost every other municipal lawsuit. The ability of
courts to make such outcome determinative decisions seems to nullify
PLCAA's attempt to prevent judicial activism.
C. IMPACT ON INDIVIDUAL LAWSUITS
1. Projected Impact
While no individual lawsuit has been tried under PLCAA's regime thus
far, both the Beretta decision and the language of PLCAA itself provide
hope to plaintiffs and gun control advocates that the Act was "drafted in
ways that should permit [individual lawsuits] to move forward."'1 49 As
with municipal lawsuits, the fate of these individual lawsuits is largely
contingent upon the judicial construction of PLCAA's exceptions. Take
for example Hernandez v. Kahr, Inc.,15° an example of a classic individual
lawsuit.
In Kahr, the plaintiff's decedent son Danny Guzman was shot to death
144. Id. at 1222.
145. Id. at 1222, 1241.
146. Motion of Manufacturer Defendants to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Judg-
ment on the Pleadings at 1, City of Gary v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 45D05-0005-CT-
243 (Ind. Nov. 23, 2005), available at http://www.nssf.org/share/legal/litigation/PDF/IN-
Gary-Deft-MtnDismis-PLCAA.pdf.
147. See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.
149. See generally Shawn Zeller, Litigating Past the Gun Suit Ban, CQ WEEKLY, Nov.
11, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 18676762.
150. Complaint at 1-23, Hernandez v. Kahr, Inc., No. WOCV2002-1747 (Mass. Sup. Ct.




with a handgun produced by defendant Kahr Arms. 151 The gun was sto-
len from Kahr Arms by an employee named Mark Cronin, who then sold
it to Robert Jachimczyk for "2 half grams of powder cocaine."' 152
Jachimczyk in turn sold the gun to Edwin Novas for "2 bundles of her-
oin," who eventually used the gun to murder Danny Guzman. 153
It was later discovered during a police investigation that Cronin, along
with other employees, "had stolen guns from Kahr even before the weap-
ons had serial numbers stamped on them, and resold them to criminals in
exchange for money and drugs.' 54 It was also determined that Cronin
"had a history of drug addiction" as well as "a criminal history [that]
could have been easily uncovered from public court records," but that
Kahr Arms never conducted any background check or drug test. 155 Fi-
nally, it was found that Kahr Arms' lack of security cameras, inventory
tracking system, or even metal detectors made security at the facility "so
shoddy that it was possible to remove weapons without detection. 1' 56
Given this, the plaintiffs now seek to hold Kahr Arms liable on the
theory that the manufacturer's negligent hiring practices and security
measures allowed for the theft of the gun used to kill their son.157 De-
fendants, however, filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action on the
ground that the "case falls squarely within the language of a 'qualified
civil liability action' barred by PLCAA," and because none of the Act's
narrow exceptions appl[y] in this case.158
One of the main exceptions at issue in Kahr is the exemption for negli-
gent entrustment claims, 159 which are defined as follows:
"[N]egligent entrustment" means the supplying of a qualified prod-
uct by a seller for use by another person when the seller knows, or
reasonably should know, the person to whom the product is supplied
is likely to, and does, use the product in a manner involving unrea-
sonable risk of physical injury to the person or others.160
Defendants argue that under a narrow reading of this exception, plain-
tiffs cannot maintain a negligent entrustment action.16' Under their in-
terpretation, the exception is inapplicable because Kahr Arms did not
151. BRADY CENTER, HERNANDEZ v. KAHR, WORCESTER, MASSACHUSETTS SUPERIOR
COURT, No. 021747C, available at http://www.gunlawsuits.org/docket/casestatus.php?Re-
cordNo=76 (last visited Aug. 25, 2006).
152. Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 2, Her-
nandez v. Kahr, Inc., WOCV2002-1747 (Mass. Sup. Ct. filed Aug. 15, 2002), available at
http://www.nssf.org/share/legal/litigation/PDF/HernandezMTD.pdf. [hereinafter Kahr Mo-
tion to Dismiss].
153. Id.




158. Kahr Motion to Dismiss, supra note 152, at 4-5.
159. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7903(5)(A)(iii) (West 2006).
160. Id. § 7903(5)(B).
161. Kahr Motion to Dismiss, supra note 152, at 6, 7.
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entrust, or even supply, the gun to Novas (the ultimate shooter). 162
Rather, the gun was stolen by Cronin, who "entrusted the firearm to
Jachimczyk, who in turn entrusted it Novas. '163 Under a broader reading
of the exception, however, a negligent entrustment action might be main-
tained. For example, it may be argued that the instant exception does not
require the sale of a firearm, but speaks only of "supplying a qualified
product." Therefore, plaintiffs might maintain that (1) Kahr Arms essen-
tially "supplied" Cronin with a large supply of readily available guns by
allowing him to work in a facility with such relaxed security measures; (2)
Kahr Arms reasonably should have known that Cronin would steal these
arms and use them illegally, given his sordid record; and (3) Cronin, by
selling the guns to drug dealers and other criminals, did in fact use the
guns "in a manner involving unreasonable risk of physical injury" 164 to
people like Danny Guzman. Thus, as with municipal lawsuits, it appears
once again that the success of Kahr (and many other individual lawsuits)
is conditioned upon a court's willingness to read PLCAA's exceptions
broadly.
D. CONCLUSION AS TO PLCAA's EFFECTIVENESS
As stated above, PLCAA's impact on pending lawsuits is greatly con-
tingent upon judicial interpretation of the Act's exceptions. Given this, it
appears that (at least for the time being) PLCAA will fail as to one of its
essential purposes: preventing judicial activism. Allowing judges to con-
strue the scope of PLCAA's exceptions invites outcome determinative
approaches and after-the-fact rationalizations. A "maverick judicial of-
ficer" who, prior to PLCAA, was able to "expand civil liability in a man-
ner never contemplated by the framers of the Constitution,"
' 165 will
certainly not be deterred by a law that allows him to define the scope of
its coverage. This fact was made plainly evident by Beretta, in which
many felt that Judge Jack B. Weinstein was able to inject his "blatant
bias" into PLCAA's exceptions by crafting an interpretation that allowed
for the success of an action that "was exactly the type of lawsuit the new
law was devised to stop. 1 6 6 This is not to say that Judge Weinstein's
opinion was necessarily incorrect; rather, it suggests that Beretta is a testa-
ment to PLCAA's ineffectiveness. While not all judges will interpret PL-
CAA as liberally as Judge Weinstein, the force of the Act will continue to
be determined by judicial discretion rather than legislative wishes.
162. Id. at 6.
163. Id.
164. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7903(5)(B).
165. Id. § 7901(a)(7).
166. Rashbaum, supra note 135, at B3 (quoting Lawrence G. Keane, attorney for the
National Shooting Sports Foundation).
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VI. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PLCAA
As stated above, thus far Beretta has been the only case to address the
constitutionality of PLCAA. While Beretta found that PLCAA passed
constitutional scrutiny, the court's ultimate decision fell upon PLCAA's
enumerated exceptions, and therefore any statements concerning the
Act's constitutionality are mere dicta. Despite this, Beretta provides a
useful tool in highlighting the major constitutional arguments surround-
ing PLCAA. The following is a summary of those arguments.
A. ANALYSIS OF PRECEDENT
In Beretta, the Eastern District of New York found that PLCAA was
constitutional based on the established principle that "Congress may, in
appropriate circumstances, out of concern for an industry, take steps to
limit liability against that industry. ' 167 In support of this contention the
court cited many previously enacted statutes that limited liability with re-
spect to certain industries. 168 The first statute cited by the court was the
General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 ("GARA"), which "created
a statute of repose for one segment of the aviation industry." 169 Prior to
GARA's enactment, the airline industry was held liable for accidents in-
volving aircrafts that were over twenty years old. 170 This "long tail of
liability" caused the industry's litigation costs to increase from "twenty-
four million dollars in 1978 to more than [two hundred] million [dollars]
in 1992," with companies like Cessna spending "almost twenty-five mil-
lion dollars per year defending lawsuits, at least one of which involved a
forty-seven year old plane. T171 Thus, GARA barred lawsuits relating to
such ancient airplanes in an attempt to "revitalize the industry and create
jobs. ' 172 Also cited in Beretta were the National Vaccine Injury Compen-
sation Program ("protect[ing] the child vaccine industry against tort lia-
bility"),173 the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act
("ATSSSA") ("limit[ing] airlines' liability" for injury claims arising out of
the September 11th terrorist attacks "to the extent of their liability insur-
ance coverage"), 174 and the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005
("provid[ing] for the removal of state class actions to federal courts where
national interests are involved" in order to "avoid abuses by some state
167. City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A., Corp., 401 F. Supp. 2d 244, 278 (E.D.N.Y.
2005).
168. See id. at 278-80.
169. Id. at 278 (citing James F. Rodriguez, Tort Reform & GARA: Is Repose Incompati-
ble with Safety?, 47 ARIz. L. REV. 577, 577-81 (2005)).
170. Id.
171. Id. (citing Rodriguez, supra note 169, at 577-81).
172. Id. at 279 (citing Rodriguez, supra note 169, at 577-81).
173. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10 to 300aa-34 (2005)).
174. Id. (citing KENNETH R. FEINBERG, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT OF THE
SPECIAL MASTER FOR THE SEPTEMBER 11TH VICIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001 (2004)
(referring to 49 U.S.C. §§ 44302-44306 (2004))).
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courts affecting industries throughout the United States"). 175 According
to the court, PLCAA, like these other statutes, was merely another exam-
ple of Congress using its power to modify "state tort and nuisance juris-
prudence" to protect the vitality of a nationally important industry. 176
The statutes cited by the Beretta court, however, are distinguishable
from PLCAA on two grounds. First, many of these statutes were enacted
in response to an actual, undisputed crisis. The ATSSSA, for example,
was passed in response to the insurance crisis following the September
11th terrorist attacks. 177 Similarly, GARA was passed only after the air-
line industry incurred an over 700% increase in liability costs and
"100,000 jobs were lost in aviation manufacturing, services, and sales. ' 178
The "crisis" faced by the Gun Industry is far more tenuous, for the $4,535
in yearly litigation costs incurred by companies like Smith & Wesson 179
are exponentially smaller than the $25 million incurred by Cessna prior to
GARA's enactment.180
Second, some of the statutes cited in Beretta limit certain claims but
provide alternative relief. For example, ATSSSA limited airlines' liability
but "established the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund, which provided vic-
tims of the attack with a remedy.' 181 Similarly, the Class Action Fairness
Act removed certain state court claims but allowed them to be brought in
federal courts.' 82 PLCAA, on the other hand, removes all "qualified civil
liability action[s]" from state and federal court, but provides no alternate
remedy.' 83 Thus, it seems that the statutes cited in Beretta do not, inde-
pendently, provide adequate grounds for PLCAA's constitutionality.
B. DUE PROcEss ANALYSIS
Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State
shall "deprive any person of their life, liberty, or property without due
process of law."'1 84 In subjecting PLCAA to a Due Process analysis, the
court in Beretta began with the presumption that there is "no vested in-
terest in injunctive relief"'185 because such relief is "subject to the contin-
uing supervisory jurisdiction of the courts, and therefore may be altered
according to subsequent changes in the law."1 86 Thus, since the Beretta
plaintiffs had no property interest in the injunctive relief they sought, a
175. Id. at 279-80 (citing George M. Vairo, Is CAFA Working?, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 14,
2005, at 12 (referring to 28 U.S.C. § 1453 (2005))).
176. See id. at 280-81.
177. Id. at 279.
178. Id. at 278-79 (citing Rodriguez, supra note 169, at 577-81).
179. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 169-72 and accompanying text.
181. Beretta, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 279 (citing FEINBERG, supra note 174 (referring to 49
U.S.C. §§ 44302-44306 (2004))).
182. Id.
183. See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 7901-7903 (West 2006).
184. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
185. Beretta, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 294.
186. Id. (quoting Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 347 (2000)).
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claim for deprivation of property without due process of law could not
possibly exist.' 8 7
This analysis, while correct, is incomplete for two reasons. First, it ig-
nores the Beretta plaintiffs' argument that the Supreme Court previously
suggested that "the government might not, 'without violence to the con-
stitutional guaranty of 'due process of law,' suddenly set aside all com-
mon-law rules respecting liability..., without providing a reasonably just
substitute.' 1 88 This, however, seems to be exactly what PLCAA does by
eliminating all redress against the Gun Industry in "qualified civil liability
actions," without providing a substitute remedy. As discussed above, it is
this complete lack of remedy that separates PLCAA from other constitu-
tional limitations on liability. 89 Thus, if a court chooses to adopt the
aforementioned principle into law, PLCAA might be found to offend due
process requirements.
Second, the Beretta court's due process analysis is incomplete because
it ignores the Supreme Court's previous concession that "[a]rguably, the
cause of action for wrongful death .. . is a species of 'property' protected
by the Due Process Clause."' 190 While no wrongful death cause of action
was asserted in Beretta, it is central to many of the "individual lawsuits"
filed against the Gun Industry.' 91 Therefore, the possibility remains
open, although unlikely, that a court might find PLCAA unconstitutional
in a wrongful death suit, or at least subject the Act to a more in-depth
Due Process analysis than applied in Beretta.
C. COMMERCE CLAUSE ANALYSIS
The Constitution's Commerce Clause provides Congress with the
power to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the sev-
eral States, and with the Indian Tribes."' 9 2 In determining that the Com-
merce Clause gave Congress the authority to pass PLCAA, the Beretta
court distinguished the instant act from two recent statutes found uncon-
stitutional by the Supreme Court. 193
In United States v. Lopez, the Supreme Court found that the Gun Free
School Zones Act of 1990 ("GFSA"), which "made it a federal crime to
knowingly possess a firearm in a school zone," was unconstitutional be-
cause it "exceeded Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause."'1 94
Similarly, the Court found a provision of the Violence Against Women
187. See id. (stating that "[c]ontrary to the city's assertion, there is no denial of due
process in the Act as applied to its case").
188. Plaintiffs' Motion in Opposition at 21-22, Beretta, 401 F. Supp. 2d 244 (No. 00 CV
3641) (citing N.Y. Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 201 (1917)).
189. See supra notes 181-83 and accompanying text.
190. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 281-82 (1980).
191. See generally Gunlawsuits.org, supra note 105.
192. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
193. City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 401 F. Supp. 2d 244, 283-88 (E.D.N.Y.
2005).




Act ("VAWA") unconstitutional for lack of Commerce Clause authority
in United States v. Morrison.1 95 The Court's "dim view" of Commerce
Clause authority in these cases caused some to believe that PLCAA
would also be found unconstitutional. 19 6 The court in Beretta, however,
distinguished PLCAA from GFSA and VAWA based on the four follow-
ing factors for Commerce Clause analysis established in Lopez and Mor-
rison: (1) "the nature of the activity regulated; (2) the presence or
absence of an express jurisdictional element; (3) the presence or absence
of congressional findings; and (4) the link between the activity regulated
and interstate commerce. '197
First, the court found that unlike VAWA, which regulated gender-moti-
vated violence, and GFSA, which regulated guns in school zones, the law-
suits regulated by PLCAA were "economic in nature," given their
financial effect on the Gun Industry.198 Second, unlike GFSA, which
"did not contain any requirement that the possession of a gun have any
connection to past interstate activity," 199 PLCAA contains a concrete ju-
risdictional element, banning only suits concerning firearms that are
"shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. '20 0 Third, as
opposed to GFSA, PLCAA enumerates a wealth of congressional find-
ings supporting the necessity of its passage.2 0 ' Finally, unlike the statutes
at issue in Lopez and Morrison, the congressional findings underlying PL-
CAA provide a sufficient "link between the activity regulated and inter-
state commerce" 20 2 by establishing a "rational basis for Congress'
determination that the Act was necessary to protect [the Gun]
industry." 20 3
In making this final determination, the court in Beretta showed great
deference to Congress by finding that it had provided a rational basis for
believing that "[s]uccessful lawsuits against the Gun Industry would ar-
guably affect the manner in which national and international manufactur-
ers and wholesalers of handguns do business. °20 4 The court made this
conclusion despite conceding that "no crippling recoveries have taken
place, and no hearings have provided empirical support .. .to congres-
sional findings regarding the possible effect of litigation upon the gun
industry. °2 0 5 This high level of deference ignores Morrison's finding that
whether "particular operations affect interstate commerce sufficiently to
come under the constitutional power of Congress to regulate them is ulti-
195. Id. at 285-86 (citing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)).
196. Peter Grier, Critics: Gun Bill Won't Hold Up in Battle: Courts Said Likely to Shoot
Down New Immunity Legislation, CONN. L. TRIn., Nov. 7, 2005, at 6 (quoting Sayre
Weaver, Legal Director of the Educational Fund to Stop Gun Violence of Washington).
197. Beretta, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 286.
198. See id. at 287-88.
199. Id. at 287 (citing Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 23 (2005)).
200. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7903(4) (West 2006).
201. See Beretta, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 287 (referring to 15 U.S.C.A. § 7901(a)).
202. Id. at 286.
203. Id. at 287 (citing Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 10).
204. Id. at 287-88.
205. Id. at 280.
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mately a judicial rather than a legislative question," along with Lopez's
finding that "[s]imply because Congress may conclude that a particular
activity substantially affects interstate commerce does not necessarily
make it so."'2°6 While these statements are not dispositive of PLCAA's
constitutionality, they suggest that the Congressional findings underlying
the Act's effect on interstate commerce should be subject to a more
searching review than conducted in Beretta.
D. SEPARATION OF POWERS ANALYSIS
As stated previously, PLCAA's passage was predicated in part based
upon a belief that judges holding the Gun Industry liable for third party
conduct were "expand[ing] civil liability in a manner never contemplated
by... Congress," 20 7 and were therefore encroaching upon an area dele-
gated to legislative authority. 20 8 According to PLCAA supporters, this
was a clear violation of the separation of powers envisioned by the Con-
stitution. PLCAA's opponents, on the other hand, argued that PLCAA
itself was a violation of the separation of powers, for "[i]f judicial law-
making violates this principle, so too does legislative adjudication" of
pending lawsuits. 20 9
Expanding upon this argument, the Beretta plaintiffs argued that PL-
CAA presented an unconstitutional separation of powers violation under
the Supreme Court's decision in United State v. Kline.210 In Kline, "the
administrator of the estate of a confederate sympathizer whose property
had been sold by federal agents during the Civil War... [brought suit] to
recover the proceeds of the sale under a federal law allowing... for such
a recovery upon proof of loyalty to the Union."'211 Since the administra-
tor's decedent received a presidential pardon (which the Supreme Court
previously held to be evidence of loyalty), the Court of Claims found for
the administrator. 212 While the case was pending, however, Congress
passed a contrary statute providing that a pardon was in fact evidence of
disloyalty and ordered "the Supreme Court to dismiss for lack of jurisdic-
tion any suit in which the claimant had established loyalty on the basis of
a pardon. '213 On appeal, the Supreme Court found that the law uncon-
stitutionally usurped judicial power by commanding the "federal courts to
reach a particular outcome in a defined set of cases. '214 Based on this
206. Id. at 286 (quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614 (2000) ("reiter-
ate[ing] select language from Lopez")).
207. 15 U.S.C.A § 7901(a)(7) (West 2006).
208. See supra Pt. IV, B.
209. Lytton, supra note 97, at A13.
210. Memorandum of Law of Plaintiff of the City of New York in Opposition to De-
fendants' Motions Under the Commerce in Arms Act to Dismiss, Vacate the Trial Date
and Stay Proceedings at 21, Beretta, 401 F. Supp. 2d. 244 (No. 00-CV-3641) [hereinafter
Beretta Plaintiffs' Motion in Opposition] (citing United States v. Kline, 80 U.S. 128, 146
(1871)).
211. Beretta, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 290 (citing Kline, 80 U.S. at 146).
212. Id.
213. Id. at 290-91.
214. Id. at 291 (citing Kline, 80 U.S. at 146).
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holding, the Beretta plaintiffs argued that PLCAA, like the statute at is-
sue in Kline, "violate[d] separation of powers by 'prescrib[ing] rules of
decision to the Judicial Department of the government in cases pending
for it.' "215
The court, however, rejected Plaintiffs' argument, suggesting that it
only presented half of Kline's holding.216 Kline, according to the court,
stood not simply for the principle that "Congress cannot through legisla-
tion direct the outcome of a pending case," but only that they cannot do
so "without changing the substantive law underlying the suit."'217 Applying
this principal, the Beretta court distinguished PLCAA from the statute in
Kline, for it does not simply order courts to dismiss "qualified civil liabil-
ity action[s]. ''218 Rather, PLCAA changed the substantive law applicable
to third party gun litigation, while leaving to the courts "the task of deter-
mining whether a claim falls within the ambit of the statute." 219
This argument concerning Kline reveals the inherent limitation that the
separation of powers doctrine places on Congress's ability to counter ju-
dicial activism. Kline holds that while a congressional attempt to direct
court decisions is certainly effective in combating activist adjudication, it
would present an unconstitutional separation of powers violation.
Rather, in order to adhere to Kline's mandate, Congress must allow
courts the ability to apply the law as governed by the statute and to deter-
mine the statute's scope, thereby inviting judicial activism. Thus, it seems
that it is this compliance with Kline and the doctrine of separation of
powers which renders PLCAA ineffective in curbing activism.
E. CONCLUSION AS TO CONSTITUTIONALITY
While the constitutional analysis of PLCAA conducted in Beretta is
neither binding nor complete, it is likely both correct and indicative of the
route future courts will take. While PLCAA supporters may see this as a
victory, in reality it suggests entirely the opposite. The fact that a judge
like Jack B. Weinstein, whose arguably "evident bias against gun manu-
facturers," led some to call for his impeachment even prior to the Beretta
case, was willing to uphold PLCAA's constitutionality, once again high-
lights the Act's ineffectiveness in combating judicial activism.220 Judge
Weinstein himself, although not explicitly, seemingly acknowledged that
arguments concerning PLCAA's constitutionality are of little substance,
for the law still "leaves to the courts 'the task of determining whether a
215. Beretta Plaintiffs' Motion in Opposition, supra note 210, at 21 (citing Kline, 80
U.S. at 146).
216. Berena, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 291-93.
217. Id. at 290 (emphasis added).
218. See id. at 293.
219. Id. (citing Axel Johnson, Inc. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 6 F.3d 78, 82 (2d Cir.
1993)).
220. News Release, Second Amendment Foundation, Second Amendment Foundation




claim falls within the ambit of the statute,"' 221 as required by Kline.
Weinstein's opinion in Beretta suggests that despite Congress's intention,
PLCAA presents the best of both worlds for judicial activists: it allows
them to avoid tough separation of powers issues by finding the Act con-
stitutional, while interpreting its exceptions in a manner that allows con-
tinued redress against the Gun Industry in almost all third party liability
claims.
VII. CONCLUSION
While this Comment is skeptical of the evidence offered in support of
PLCAA and the Act's animosity towards proposed safety measures, it
does not purport to determine the statute's true necessity. The figures
offered by those on opposing sides of the gun debate are too extremely
disparate to shed any real light on this issue. Rather, the merit of Gun
Industry liability immunity is a matter of opinion, contingent less upon
statistics concerning the cost of gun litigation and more upon one's funda-
mental belief whether guns, and the right to sell and carry them, are good
or bad for society. Whatever this opinion may be, however, it appears
that PLCAA is likely constitutional, and therefore here to stay.
Despite being here to stay, however, PLCAA will be largely ineffective
in serving its two enumerated purposes: limiting judicial activism and
preventing a litigation crisis for the gun industry. This impotence is the
result of the judiciary's role in interpreting PLCAA's exceptions, thereby
defining the Act's scope in an outcome-determinative manner. "Maver-
ick judicial officer[s]," whom PLCAA supporters believed were ex-
panding the common law in an unwarranted fashion, are unlikely to be
deterred by a statute whose coverage they can define. When such judges
are able to foster the success of the very lawsuits that PLCAA was de-
signed to prevent, then the Act will also be ineffective in saving the Gun
Industry from a litigation crisis (assuming that such a crisis exists). It is
PLCAA's failure to serve these two enumerated purposes that renders it
a bad act.
Congress, however, might argue that PLCAA's lack of bite is not a
result of poor drafting but is instead the manifestation of an inherent
limit on Congress's ability to combat activist adjudicating. Drafting an
"activist-proof" statute would result in an endless stream of legislation
and constant one-upsmanship by the judiciary. On the other hand, any
attempt by Congress to simply dictate verdicts and rob the judiciary of its
interpretative functions would certainly violate the Separation of Powers
Doctrine as defined by Kline.
This argument, while true, reveals two problems at the core of PL-
CAA. First, PLCAA represents an attempt by Congress to do something
that it is simply unable to do: prohibit judicial discretion. The fact that
the Constitution and the separation of powers inherently bind Congress's
221. Beretta, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 293 (quoting Axel Johnson, Inc., 6 F.3d at 83).
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hands in combating judicial activism is no excuse. Were Congress to en-
act a law prohibiting Presidential veto, we would surely not spare them
from criticism simply because the act's ineffectiveness was the result of an
inherent Constitutional limitation. Why should PLCAA's failed attempt
to prevent judicial activism be any different?
Second, PLCAA's ineffectiveness reveals the Act for what it really is: a
political stunt meant to assuage the concerns of those on both sides of the
gun debate without actually doing anything of substance. By drafting PL-
CAA, Congress appeased gun manufacturers and owners by loading its
legislative barrel and taking aim at maverick adjudicating and the gun
litigation crisis. However, the PLCAA also provides a pleasant surprise
for municipalities and gun control advocates, who have now come to real-
ize that the congressional bullets used to attack judicial activism were
merely blanks. Such hollow political compromises are not the province
of Congress, whose time would be better spent on legitimate legislation.
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